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Presidential Warfare and the “Forever Wars”
Mel Gurtov
and sabotage; and using unofficial (and
deniable) assets such as the CIA, private
company mercenaries, and third-country
partners.

Abstract: This article examines the origins and
development of the US “forever wars” in recent
decades, and its implications both for
democracy and warfare.

No one understands the game better than Joe
Biden, who as a senator had a consistent
record of opposing the use of force without
Congressional approval. He says he wants to
end the “forever wars” in the Middle East. As
Afghanistan shows, however, “ending” does not
actually mean terminating. With the Taliban
now intent on overthrowing the US-supported
government, and many in Congress already
critical of Biden’s troop withdrawal, US policy
will actually entail reducing US involvement,
using a different mix and level of
intervention—what he calls “over-the-horizon
capabilities.” The “forever wars” will go on,
justified by an understanding of presidential
power that leaves enormous room for military
action even when troops are withdrawn.

Once upon a time, American leaders only went
to war when, in accordance with the
Constitution, Congress declared it. That
practice has long since been abandoned. In
recent times Congress either votes to
“authorize” a war already underway or is only
casually consulted if at all. Though the 1993
War Powers Bill was meant to restrain an
imperial president who had led the country to
defeat in Vietnam, no president since has
faithfully followed that law’s requirements.
Thus, whereas in authoritarian systems the
great leader simply orders troops into action, in
democracies like ours, going to war is sneakier,
in two ways.

In the Middle East since the George W. Bush
administration, the legal basis for US military
involvement has been Congressional
Authorizations for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF). Authorizations amount to blank
checks, and have been freely exploited by
Democratic and Republican presidents alike to
attack terrorists and unfriendly states, support
allies, and sustain very large forces in the
region. The authorizations are so expansive
that they could be used to go to war with Iran,
attack the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons
depots, protect Israel, or reintroduce forces in
and around Afghanistan. Biden says he would
like to revoke the 2002 AUMF, which was

First, in justifications, as when the
President decides to dispatch troops or
otherwise use force on the basis of his
role as commander-in-chief, invoking
“national security,” the “national
interest,”
“regional
stability,”
“humanitarian intervention,” “restoring
order,” and other wide-open categories
that most Congress-members are loath to
challenge.
Second, in methods, using indirect
warfare, such as drones, special forces,
economic and cyber attacks, sanctions,
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Narrowing the 2001 and 2002 [AUMFs]
would leave this presidential power
untouched.

directed at Iraq, and he apparently has support
in both houses of Congress to do that. But that
still leaves the much broader 2001 AUMF,
which gives the president the power to
"prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States." His
capacity to deploy forces and use other assets
in the Middle East and Africa will not be all
that constrained.*

But the problem goes much deeper than
presidential hubris. Congress may often be
behind the curve when it comes to national
security, but it is still part of the problem
rather than the solution. Bipartisanship has
much to do with the expansion of presidential
power in national security matters. A majority
in Congress almost always rejects efforts to
limit the commander-in-chief’s authority, as
shown, for example, during the Bill Clinton
intervention in the Balkan wars of the 1990s
and the post-9/11 start of endless wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Republicans and Democrats
then refused to restrain a president by recourse
to the War Powers Bill. In fact, if that bill were
up for a vote today—and two senators plan on
doing just that—it probably wouldn’t pass,
whereas if continued direct US involvement in
Afghanistan—or sending troops to Haiti in
order to “help restore order”—were put to a
vote, those actions probably would pass. The
reality, of course, is that a president wouldn’t
put any of those decisions to a vote by
Congress.

Remember Ronald Reagan’s secret war making
in Central America, which culminated in the
Iran-Contra affair? That operation, though
eventually exposed, demonstrated how a
president determined to defeat a particular
enemy (Nicaragua) could go around Congress
and, with the help of dogmatic advisers and
secret channels, erect a sophisticated network
of state and private entities to fund war
fighting. The Democratic opposition in
Congress fought a rearguard action as it
struggled for legislative language that would
tie Reagan’s hands. The lesson of Iran-Contra is
that presidents have enormous resources at
their disposal for conducting wars. A skeptical
or hostile Congress is often playing catch-up.
Two scholars who have served in government
have this to say about the current state of
affairs with respect to restricting presidential
authority to make war:

To understand the limited significance of
[Biden’s] approach [on AUMFs] to ending
the forever wars, you need look no further
than Mr. Biden’s Feb. 25 airstrikes in
eastern Syria against the Iran-backed
militias responsible for assaults on U.S.
and allied personnel in Iraq. The United
States is not at war with Syria or Iran, and
Congress had not authorized the strikes.
The president ordered them nonetheless,
based on his independent authority, under
Article II of the Constitution, “to conduct
United States foreign relations and as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”

There are also implications here for US
relations with China and Russia, which remain
(as they were under Donald Trump) the top
2
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advance; the bloated military budget, three
times the size of China’s and ten times
Russia’s, must be deeply cut; the use of force
must be proportional and seldom used; and
diplomacy must be reenergized, with an accent
on engaging adversaries as well as friends.
President Biden is correct to say that foreign
policy begins at home. But he must avoid the
trap presidents typically fall into—the
temptation of undemocratic war making.

national security threats. Congress once again
is following the president’s lead, which is heavy
on ominous rhetoric and sanctions but light on
creative diplomacy. How might Congress react
if, for example, Biden were to decide (vis-à-vis
Russia) to ramp up military exercises near
Ukraine and pressure Germany to terminate
the Nord Stream gas pipeline; or (vis-à-vis
China) to walk back support of the one-China
pledge and begin US-Japan joint naval
maneuvers on China’s borders? In today’s
political climate of demonizing both Russia and
China, Congress would be reduced to an
ancillary role in what would clearly be Cold
War II. Worse yet, this abdication of
responsibility could put the world on the
threshold of a nuclear confrontation just when
common security ideas are most needed.

*The joint House-Senate resolution in 2001
says: “That the President is authorized to use
all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.”

I conclude that no significant inroads in
presidential power in foreign affairs are
possible without redefining US national
security. Foreign policy needs to be humanized
and demilitarized; Congress must resist
authorizing poorly defined military action in
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